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Abstract
We compare the neo-Galtonian and nomothetic approaches of psychological
research. While the former focuses on summarized statistics that depict av-
erage subjects, the latter focuses on general facts of form ‘if conditions then
restricted outcomes’. The nomothetic approach does not require quantifica-
tion as a convenient way of statistical modeling. The nice feature of a general
fact is its falsifiability by the observation of a single case. Hence, as a clear
sense of scientific error is re-introduced in the research paradigm, we detail
two kinds of puzzle-solving: repairing general facts by contraction or by ex-
pansion of the initial conditions. This style of research does not require that
researchers depend on highly skilled engineers in data analysis, as the very
structure of a general fact can be established by scrutinizing a contingency
table.
Keywords: methodology, measurement error, general fact, falsifiability
The present article contrasts two research focuses in Psychology. As these
research focuses define two classes of goals, we will call them paradigms. The
first one has been called neo-Galtonian by Danziger (1987, 1990) and is most
generally used in mainstream methodology in psychology, while the second
one can be properly called nomothetic, as argued by Lamiell (1998) and
Vautier (2011, 2013), and constitutes a blind spot of psychological research.
Let P1 and P2 denote neo-Galtonian and nomothetic research, respectively.
To describe concisely these two paradigms, the mathematical concept of a
relation will be useful.1 A (binary) relation from a set A on a set B is defined
1According to French philosopher of science Gilles-Gaston Granger (1995), “Scientific
Preprint submitted to New Ideas in Psychology October 25, 2013
Neo‐Galtonian (P1) 
prediction is based on a 
false function 
f(X) = Ŷ 
X’s permissible values Y’s permissible values
Nomothetic (P2) prediction
is based on a general fact
X   Y  
The independent variable X
is a descriptive function
The dependent variable Y is
a descriptive function
Statistical
population
Figure 1: The common statistical structure of neo-Galtonian and nomothetic forms of
prediction, and their specific features.
by a set of ordered pairs (a, b) such that a is in A (a ∈ A) and b is in B.
(This set is called the graph of the relation.)
Whereas the P1’s researcher is used to being satisfied with relations that
emerge from aggregates of persons but are logically irrelevant to depict phe-
nomena at the scale of single persons (see, e.g., Danziger, 1987; Krause, 2011;
Lamiell, 2003, 2013; Molenaar, 2004), the P2’s researcher inspects the same
data to discover a special case of relations, what Vautier (2013) calls general
facts, which are, by definition, true for any person. As depicted in Figure
1, an easy to spot difference would be that, whereas P1 focuses on expected
point-values, P2 focuses on a necessary set of values. P1’s slogan may be
expressed as follows:
Y = f(X) + E, (1)
knowledge based on experience always consists of constructing schemas or abstract models
of this same experience and uses the relations between the abstract elements of these mod-
els to deduce–through logic and mathematics–properties that correspond with sufficient
precision to directly observable empirical properties.” (p. 95, authors’ translation)
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where Y is the dependent variable, X is the independent variable and de-
scribes initial conditions, f is a function of these conditions, and E denotes
a random component that obeys a convenient probability law. The crucial
concept here is that of a function, that is, the special case of a relation such
that f(X) is a single value2.
Contrastingly, P2’s slogan can be formulated as follows:
X ∈ α⇒ Y ∈ β, (2)
where α and β are non-empty strict subsets of X and Y ’s sets of permissible
values (the respective codomains of X and Y ). Thus, although P2 does not
preclude a functional relationship, it does not expect it. What is especially
expected is that the descriptive device provided by X and Y ’s codomains
will suggest that there is a least one subset of initial conditions which works
as a sufficient condition for a strict subset of Y ’s codomain.
What is at stake is to move freely from one research paradigm to an-
other, instead of defining opposite and mutually ignoring camps. Within P1,
psychologists are used to manipulate propositions pertaining to ‘constructs’
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955); for critical views, see Maraun (1998) and Michell
(2013). As a corollary, P1-psychologists are trained to accept the institu-
tional division of labour between the psychologist, whose expertise pertains
to substantive theory, that is, the realm of constructs or the ‘nomological
network’, and the statistician (or psychometrician), whose expertise deals
with data analysis. A catastrophic consequence of this division of labor is
that the sense of scientific error within the discipline becomes more and more
esoteric or even socially irrelevant (see, e.g., Borsboom, 2006). This is why,
if psychologists are motivated to make a science of their discipline (see, e.g.,
Borsboom et al., 2009; Lilienfeld, 2010; Vautier, 2011), they have to take
intellectual responsibility for its epistemology and methodology. Within P2,
division of labor is superfluous. However, the required intellectual style obeys
Monsieur Teste’s injunction: “Always demand proof, proof is the elementary
courtesy that is anyone’s due” (Vale´ry, 1973, p. 65).
In the first section of the present article, it is argued that P1’s slogan
mimics functional prediction in the natural sciences, but the price to be paid
2A (statistical) variable is also a relation, which is defined from the set of a population–
called its domain–on the set of its admissible values–its codomain. The population is the
domain of X and Y . The function f is a relation from the codomain of the independent
variable X on the codomain of the dependent variable Y .
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is that the sense of approximation that characterizes the natural sciences
is lost. P2’s slogan rejects the functional imperative by acknowledging ir-
reducible indetermination of prediction and instead hypothesizes restricted
approximation. The second section opposes the infalsifiability of predictive
statements in P1 to the falsifiability of predictive statements in P2. The third
section exposes two kinds of puzzle-solving P2-researchers have to deal with.
1. Prediction: Restricted vs. Unrestricted Range of Approxima-
tion
Let us take Kuhn’s (1996) words to get a sense of what empirical approx-
imation means in this context:
Perhaps the most striking feature of the normal research prob-
lems we have just encountered [in the physical sciences] is how
little they aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenom-
enal. Sometimes, as in a wave-length measurement, everything
but the most esoteric detail of the result is known in advance,
and the typical latitude of expectation is only somewhat wider.
Coulomb’s measurements need not, perhaps, have fitted an in-
verse square law; the men who worked on heating by compression
were often prepared for any one of several results. Yet even in
cases like these the range of anticipated, and thus of assimilable,
results is always small compared with the range the imagination
can conceive. And the project whose outcome does not fall in
that narrower range is usually just a research failure, one which
reflects not on nature but on the scientist. (p. 35)
In other terms, the paradigmatic slogan of normal quantitative science ex-
presses as
y = f(x) + , (3)
where y and x are quantitative variables, f is a numerical function, and 
denotes an approximation component within a restricted 100% confidence
interval. By ‘restricted’, we mean that the range of the expected outcomes
enables the researcher to eliminate a wide subset of logically possible out-
comes that the measurement procedure allows.
For example, we can determinate that Paul’s height today lies between
1.74 and 1.76 cm, and this range of approximation is compatible with the
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claim that the probability to find that, in suitable measurement conditions,
Paul’s height today is not in this interval is null. If it was the case, such a
finding would merely reflect a measurement aberration–not a measurement
error. In P1-psychology, such a finding would be qualified as measurement
error. To make the point clear, it suffices to remark that the random com-
ponent in Equation (1) takes its values in the set of the possible values of
the dependent variable. Usually, this variable is given a Gaussian probability
density function, which is valued in ] −∞, +∞[. Hence, this approach to
prediction precludes aberrant outcomes: any outcome is possible.
It is a striking paradox that quantitative psychology, while having adapted
its paradigmatic slogan from Equation (3) to Equation (1), has conceded
the epistemological principle of unpredictability of its dependent variables.
Consequently, the concept of (restricted) approximation used in the natural
sciences has been lost. The prediction Yˆ = f(X) becomes a better expec-
tation, yet preserving practical utility for decision making in mass settings.
Imitation of quantitative laws saves the form of approximative prediction in
Equation (3), as Yˆ is a real value, but ratifies total ignorance at the scale
of the observation unit since the approximation of prediction is now unre-
stricted.
The paradigm P2 goes one step further, as its typical goal consists in
re-introducing the sense of restricted approximation in psychological predic-
tion. There is a double issue at stake. First, if it is acknowledged that P1-
psychology is valid only for mass psychology, there is a need for a genuinely
general psychological science, i.e., a science valid (and hopefully, sound) for
any psychological system. In clinical psychology, in cognitive psychology, in
developmental psychology, psychological systems correspond to single per-
sons and not to collectives of persons. Even in social psychology, the unit of
analysis is a person whose behavior is analyzed with respect to a group of per-
sons. However, P1-psychology admits that the single person is unpredictable.
For example, according to Rasch (1960),
Where it is a question of human beings and their actions, it ap-
pears quite hopeless to construct models which can be useful for
purposes of prediction in separate cases. On the contrary, what
a human being actually does seems quite haphazard, none less
than radioactive emission. (p. 11)
In the perspective of P2-psychology, such a claim deserves verification. Thus,
the target of P2-psychology consists in predictions with restricted approx-
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imation. Importantly, usefulness of P2’s program for social engineering in
mass settings should not be mandatory, as restricted approximation means
exactly that what is to be predicted is a strict subset of values (which does
not entail that its cardinality is one–in which case the prediction would be a
point value). Thus, a priori, psychological phenomena that can be described
by psychologists do not warrant the degree to which approximation can be
reduced and the fact that approximation is restricted is a starting hypothesis.
Coming back to Equation (1), the aim is to discover initial conditions
(pertaining to X) that warrant bounded residual variability, in such a way
that knowing the initial conditions, it would be possible to exclude at least
one admissible value of the dependent variable (Y ). Such aim involves a re-
versal of perspective: whereas Equation (1) focuses on the positive, punctual,
necessary, and in fact false value Yˆ given X, Equation (2) focuses on a strict
necessary and hopefully true subset β given X. P2’s perspective reconciles
psychological research and what constitues for us the very wisdom of scien-
tific knowledge, which consists in admitting and recognizing various forms
of objective impossibility. Indeed, Equation (2) focuses equivalently on the
complement set β¯ of empirical impossible values given X. Let M(Y ) denote
Y ’s codomain (set of admissible values). The existence of β implies that of
its non-empty complement β¯:
M(Y ) \ β = β¯. (4)
Thus, P2 focuses on a set β¯ of empirically impossible, although logically pos-
sible, events conditionally to given initial conditions identified as α, a strict
subset of X’s codomain. The reversal of focus from necessity to impossibility
echoes Popper’s (1959) profound remark: “[natural laws] do not assert that
something exists or is the case; they deny it” (p. 48).
In addition, there is no need to postulate that natural laws are quantita-
tive, and the dependent variable Y may be qualitative in “nature”–although
the definition of the codomain of any function Y is not natural but cultural
(Danziger, 1990).3 This is the second issue at stake with adopting P2’s re-
search focus. To sum up, the shift from P1 to P2 is double: quantitative
3“But in truth scientific psychology does not deal in natural objects. It deals in test
scores, rating scales, response distributions, serial lists, and innumerable other items that
the investigator does not find but constructs with great care. Whatever guesses are made
about the natural world are totally constrained by this world of artifact” (p. 2).
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dependent variables are replaced by qualitative ones, and the expected pre-
diction, a point-value, is replaced by a necessary strict subset of values.
2. Testability of Predictions
As far as Equation (1) comprises the random component E, and given
that E’s distribution is usually thought of as Gaussian, it is clear that a state-
ment of form (1) denies nothing: given any image of X (or any observed value
on X), Y may take any value in its codomain M(Y ). Actually, the normal
distribution of E is a crude and logically unsuitable approximation because
M(Y ) is bounded and discrete (e.g., a test scale is a finite numerical series,
see Vautier et al., 2011, 2012). The crucial point is that the random vari-
able is defined in such a way that its range of possible values is unrestricted,
that is, it implies no impossible values in M(Y ). As “it is a fallacy to infer
an individual propensity from a statistical analysis of the distribution of a
property in a population” (Harre´, 2004, p. 7), the random variable E plays
the role of an interpretative concept, by contrast to a falsifiable probabilistic
hypothesis about residual variability associated with the observable response
of a class of observation units from the population. Thus, P1 focuses on the
appearance of punctual predictability (for the sake of social utility) and loses
falsifiability at the level of a class of observation units induced by a given
value on X.
The paradigm P2 focuses on falsifiability, even if it means that punctual
predictability may be lost as the primary motivation of the research project–
which does not entail that punctual estimation is lost if this kind of goal is
to be pursued for other non-scientific reasons. The logical form of Equation
(2) implies that if it is true, the following statement is true as well:
Y ∈ β¯ ⇒ X ∈ α¯. (5)
As X and Y ’s values are observables, Equation (2) is falsifiable: it is logically
possible to observe
Y ∈ β¯ & X ∈ α, (6)
in which case Equation (5) is false and hence Equation (2) is also false.
3. Puzzle-solving
Kuhn (1996) describes normal research as puzzle-solving. We have diffi-
culties to figure out how normal research in P1 could be described as puzzle-
solving at the scale of classes of single cases defined by their common value
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on X, as unrestricted approximation is normal. Instead, we understand
normal research in P1 as a kind of fuzzy process of “translation” of non-
empirical ideas–that hardly match the concept of falsifiable theory–into sta-
tistical statements that depict the average subject. A characteristic feature of
P1 is that (substantive) theory is intrinsically disconnected with description
(and hence genuine measurement) of real persons. Theoretical explanation
consists mainly in elaboration of abstract representations about inobservables
and demonstration of confirmatory operationalized evidence at the level of
aggregates (Danziger, 1987; Vautier, 2011). In P2, theoretical explanation
(or invention, Hempel, 1966) has no object until one empirical law has been
formulated. We do not know of a single report in psychological literature har-
boring an empirical statement of form (2). Actually, nomological networks
of psychological constructs advocated by Cronbach & Meehl (1955) work
as pre-theoretical or pre-scientific concepts. This is because scientific con-
cepts require empirical regularities to have an empirical meaning. The task
of nomothetic (P2-)psychology consists of discovering descriptive approaches
able to reveal lawful–and non trivial–phenomena. In the meantime, normal
science in nomothetic psychology consists of indexing candidates for lawful
statements, and then in indexing and elucidating their associated counter-
examples.
To analyse the puzzle-solving’s structure in P2, it will be useful to detail
how the variables X and Y are functions (cf. Figure 1). Their common
domain is a discrete set Ω = {ωi, i = 1, . . . }, and their codomains are
M(X) and M(Y ), respectively:
X : Ω −→ M(X)
Y : Ω −→ M(Y ) (7)
The important concept is that of the empirical support Ω. The population is
a set of observation units of form ω = (u, t), which denote a person u located
in time t. There are two possible starting points. The first one is a general
fact (Vautier, 2011, 2013), that is, the triplet (Ωn, α, β) such that
∃ α ⊂M(X), β ⊂M(Y ),
∀ ω ∈ Ωn ⊂ Ω, X(ω) ∈ α⇒ Y (ω) ∈ β. (8)
In other terms, the triplet (Ωn, α, β) represents a non tautological fact, of
which the generality is bounded to the n objects (or observation units) of the
world Ωn. The general fact stipulates sufficient conditions, namely having
the property α, for having the property β.
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Table 1: Conjoint distribution of test scores and illness state.
Test scores i ¬i
[40, 71] 26 2
[72, 87] 35 51
[88, 94] 0 40
Note. i = illness, ¬i = non illness.
Let us take the example of a memory test the total score from which is
used to predict the presence of illness i (Lacot et al., 2011). Thus, M(X) is
a univariate set of test scores; specifically, M(X) = {40, 41, . . . , 94}. And
M(Y ) = {i, ¬i}. The data here update Lacot et al.’s data with a sample of
154 participants. Table 1 exhibits the general fact
∀ ω ∈ Ω154, X(ω) ∈ [88, 94]⇒ Y (ω) = ¬i, (9)
which suggests a law on the parent population Ω.
Now, a counter-example is the new observation unit ω155 ∈ Ω \Ω154 such
that
X(ω155) ∈ α & Y (ω155) ∈ β¯, (10)
where α = [88, 94] and β¯ = {i}. Thus, the counter-example ω155 does not
falsify the general fact (Ω154, α, β) but the law (Ω, α, β).
Repairing the law is the P2-puzzle. Such problem has the same structure
as that of repairing what we call a pseudo-general fact; which constitutes the
second possible starting point. In research practice, the latter may be more
relevant than the former. A pseudo-general fact is a general fact suffering
few counter-examples. Table 1 exhibits the following pseudo-general fact:
∀ ω ∈ Ω154, X(ω) ∈ [40, 71]⇒ Y (ω) = i, (11)
which is false because of two counter-examples. Let us note them ω153 and
ω154.
Thus, the puzzle is to repair the general fact (11). Levi (1980) suggests
two repairing approaches. The first one is contraction of M(X) (see Figure
2, upper panel), while the second one is its expansion (see Figure 2, lower
panel).
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Figure 2: Two strategies for law repairing: Contraction and expansion of the validity
domain of a law (in gray, specification of the initial conditions). α = the initial conditions
for a law. α′ = the contracted conditions (where the initial conditions have been adapted–
contracted–to exclude falsifying cases). α′′ = the expanded conditions (where the initial
conditions have been expanded, with relevant descriptive variables, to exclude falsifying
cases). M(X) = the codomain of X (with the initial conditions). M ′′(X) = the codomain
of X ′′ (with the expanded conditions).
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3.1. Contraction
Contraction aims at restricting the initial conditions to save their suffi-
cient character. Let Ωn′ be the set of counter-examples, and M
′(X) the set
of their images by X. Coming back to our example, we have to consider that
Ωn′ is comprised of the elements ω153 and ω154. The data reveal that these
two exceptions had test scores of 51 and 67 (M ′(X) = {51, 67}). The idea
consists of removing these specific initial conditions from the statement (11).
Let α′ = α \M ′(X). Thus,
∀ ω ∈ Ω154, X(ω) ∈ α′ ⇒ Y (ω) ∈ β. (12)
Repairing (Ω154, α, β) yields (Ω154, α
′, β), where α′ ⊂ α (and, trivially,
α′ 6= ∅).
Coming back to the example, we get α′ = [40, 50] ∪ [52, 66] ∪ [68, 71].
However, the substantive meaning of such repairing has to be assessed. We
get no insight in removing the specific values 51 and 67 from the initial
conditions because we are not ready here to question the assumption that
the test scores measure an ordinal attribute. If we expect that the dependent
variable depends on certain levels of the attribute in such a way that low
levels predict illness, it does not make sense to admit that the level 70 for
example predicts illness whereas the level 67 does not predict illness, because
the level 67 is also a low level. Consequently, the contraction approach may
be useful only if it makes sense to restrict the initial conditions. Another
way of contracting the initial conditions would be to retain only the subset
of levels [40, 50] and to admit that the intermediate subset which provides
no prediction is redefined as [51, 87]; this would preserve the intuition that
there are low levels of X that predict illness.
Some readers (like one of the anonymous reviewers of the present paper)
could ask for the difference between “mere theory disconfirmation” and “the
programmatics of fashioning of better theory”. Let us suppose that these
two cases are out of doubt (if they were, they should not be considered as
falsifying cases). Do the two discrepant cases falsify any theory? They fal-
sify the general claim stated in Equation (11). Do we have any theory that
implies this general fact? We have only the intuition that low levels should
predict illness, if no other conditions that are ignored in the definition of
X’s codomain are relevant, and we also admit that other conditions may be
relevant, at least at certain levels of X. Thus, we should not be surprised by
the finding of falsifying cases because we know that the descriptive strategy
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which consists in considering that all relevant initial conditions are taken into
account in X’s codomain is naive. Moreover, test scores are not undisputable
descriptive values: In a nutshell, the test scores are the names of equivalence
classes of multivariate descriptions (usually, the responses to the test items),
and the ordering that is imposed on these classes via their numeration (scor-
ing) is a disputable convention, a fact that is not new (Johnson, 1935, 1943)
but remains usually ignored (Michell, 1990, 1997, 2000). We cannot discuss
the theoretical and methodological consequences of such criticism in this pa-
per (but we do it elsewhere). Thus, if we maintain the intuition that, ceteris
paribus, low levels on X should imply illness, and because the ceteris paribus
condition is not controlled, contraction may be useful for prediction based
both on evidence and intuition if we assume that within the contracted range,
which is [40, 50], some ‘factors’ that are relevant out of this range can be
neglected within this range. Of course, such reasoning is perfectly inductive
(ad hoc) and thus requires further testing. If further tests were to corrobo-
rate the contracted statement, there is no need to propose potential relevant
factors within this range and then for raising the issue of their empirical de-
scription; if these tests falsify it, contraction failed and the issue consists of
discovering the relevant factors, which yields expansion.4
3.2. Expansion
From the point of view of the known initial conditions, any observation
unit ω is described in M(X). For the sake of simplicity, we have chosen
our working example because X offers a univariate description. To illus-
trate the logic of expansion, we will consider only additional descriptions
(potential relevant factors) that were ignored in X’s codomain definition,
but are nevertheless available in the data (viz., gender, age, and educational
level). Thus, considering additional descriptive factors (or dimensions ac-
cording to Krause, 2010) in the initial conditions yields to considering a
multivariate independent variable, that is, a vector of descriptive functions
X1X2 . . . Xm, in which case its codomain is the m-ary Cartesian product
M(X1)×M(X2)×· · ·×M(Xm), where m is the number of factors that serve
to describe the observation units’ initial conditions.
The idea of expansion as opposed to contraction consists of discovering
an independent variable, to be denoted by X ′′, that is useful to specify the
4An other consequence is that the theoretical and yet descriptive grounds of the test
scores could be seriously questioned, but we ignore this way here.
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counter-examples with respect to the initial conditions. The dimensionality
of the codomain M(X ′′) is unknown and ranges in [1, 2, . . . , m − 1]. Let
us supposes that X ′′ does exists and let α′′ be the subset that contains the
images of the counter-examples in M(X ′′). The updated initial conditions
are
α′ = α ∪ (M(X ′′) \ α′′), (13)
and the independent variable becomes XX ′′. Repairing (Ωn, α, β) yields
(Ωn, α
′, β).
Coming back to the example, the two counter-examples share specifically
the conjonctive property of being female, more than 83 years old, and not
having studied at the secondary educational level. The word “specifically”
is crucial here because it is necessary that the remaining observation units
do not possess this property. Let α′′ denote this descriptive state–X ′′ is a
3-variate function based on gender, age, and educational level. Thus, the
pseudo-general fact (11) may be repaired as the following general fact:
∀ ω ∈ Ω154,
(
X(ω) ∈ [40, 71] & X ′′(ω) /∈ α′′)⇒ Y (ω) = i, (14)
The preceding statement highlights the fact that expansion consists in
saving a general statement by isolating its falsifying cases, which consists
of adding negative requirements (e.g., not being female and more than 83
years old and having a ‘low’ educational level) to the initial conditions (e.g.,
having a low test score or, in other terms, the test score is in [40, 71]). Like
contraction, expansion is an inductive solution to the falsifying cases. Does
it help improve theory? Not at all because there is no theory to predict the
general statement to be saved. Hence, there is no theory to save or improve
at all. In our understanding of what a scientific theory is, it is an abstract
restatement of natural or experimental, or empirical laws that articulate these
laws with parsimony (see Duhem, 1991). Consequently, there is no scientific
theory in a field of research if this field contains no law–just intuitions. This is
why the main stake of scientific research in psychology consists in discovering
genuine laws, and hence, to discover general facts. This is why we believe
that the formalization of a general fact deserves to be known by nomothetic
researchers, as it is more difficult to look for a general fact if one ignores its
defining property (Vautier, 2011). The ability to describe a data set by a
statement of form (2) is a good test for deciding whether the data reveals a
general fact.
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3.3. Known cardinality of a general fact
The known cardinality of an empirical general fact can be simply mea-
sured by the number of its relevant observation units: Each time a new
observation unit falling into the class α falls into the class β (i.e., a posi-
tive observation), or each time a new observation unit falling into the class
β¯ falls into the class α¯ (i.e., a negative observation), the known cardinality
increments of one unit. It could be useful to introduce the following notation:
(Ω, α, β)[c1, c2], (15)
where c1 and c2 denote the number of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ observations,
respectively, and c1 + c2 measures the known cardinality.
A general fact repaired by contraction of α to α′ inherits the cardinality
of the equivalence class induced by α′ on Ωn. When a general fact has been
repaired by expansion, two situations have to be distinguished. First, if
it can be verified that the remaining observation units do not possess the
isolating properties α′′, the cardinality of the repaired fact is that of its
predecessor minus the number of counter-examples. But as the descriptive
variable used to isolate the counter-examples may be new, which yields the
second situation, the descriptive status of the remaining observation units
with respect to X ′′ is unknown. Consequently, the researcher has to suppose
that the remaining observation units do not possess the isolating property
α′′. As this supposition is uncertain, the cardinality of the repaired general
fact is reset, hence the triplet (Ω, α′, β)[0, 0].
4. Discussion
In the neo-Galtonian paradigm, researchers investigate summarized prop-
erties of collectives of persons, which describe the average subject, that is,
nobody in particular. Consequently, individual observations cannot play the
role of falsifying cases in this paradigm; this is the reason why statistical P1
models hardly match the notion of an empirical law, but work much as inter-
pretative devices interfacing “hard data” and “soft ideas” via conventional
operationalization (Vautier, 2011).
The search for empirical laws requires a descriptive language of form
M(X)×M(Y ) and a population Ω, from which observations can be made–
an observation is a basic statement of form XY (ω) = xiyj. If there is a law
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in [Ω, M(X)×M(Y )], it has the form (Ω, α, β), where
1 ≤ |α| ≤ |M(X)|,
1 ≤ |β| < |M(Y )|. (16)
A law is a special relation that can be characterized by the fact that its graph
G is a strict subset of M(X)×M(Y ):5
G ⊂M(X)×M(Y ). (17)
Let us call |β| − 1 the degrees of freedom (dfs) of the law (Ω, α, β). By
definition, if df = 0, the law is totally deterministic; otherwise, it is partially
deterministic. As an anonymous reviewer of a previous version of this article
suggested, one may be attracted by reducing the dfs of the law. However, we
will argue that this line of ‘puzzle-solving’ is programmatically premature, as
it supposes that a law of positive dfs has already been established. It seems
not an exaggeration to state that such laws are rare in psychology. Even if
one proposes a law with too many dfs (df > 1), the first task is to test it. If
it is easy to find falsifying observations, there are no dfs to reduce because
there is no law. Then, the logic of testing suggests the P2-researcher to focus
on the search for falsifying cases, or at least for a practically sufficient amount
of corroborating evidence if no falsifying cases can be found.
When the starting point of a corroborated law is available, the reducing
task to improve the granularity (or precision) of prediction will consist in
refining the description of the initial conditions, in order to find ‘nomothetic
moderators’.6 However, as long as psychological knowledge is framed in the
P1-language of radical indeterminacy–there is no restriction on the permis-
sible values of any phenomenon given any initial conditions–, such starting
points will be lacking. If the proposed law is not trivial, the law is unlikely,
and it is likely that it will be falsified, which entails that the main scientific
task will be to repair it rather than to restrict its dfs.
5The graph of the relation from M(X) to M(Y ) as it is known with respect to the
available evidence from the sample Ωn is defined as follows:
G = {(xi, yj)| ∃ ωk ∈ Ωn, X(ωk) = xi & Y (ωk) = yj},
where i and j index X and Y ’s observed values, respectively.
6Krause’s (2010) approach to the search for sufficient condition causes rejects the neo-
Galtonian approach to scientific human psychology, but maintains the search for punctual
prediction in M(Y ).
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In such game where the target is a law, any pre-scientific inspiring source
is allowed for descriptive attempts, provided the result is a general fact
(Ω, α, β)[c1, c2] with c1 and c2 as big as possible. Moreover, until no general
fact has been discovered, any substantive theory is, by definition, premature
as nomothetic theory. As Krause (2010) has stated,
If there is no SCCs [sufficient condition causes] in the subject
matter domain of scientific human psychology, then there is no
explanatory science of human psychology, because then there can-
not properly be said to be any definable psychological causes of
human psychological phenomena but, perhaps, only probabilistic
psychological predictors of such phenomena. (p. 59)
There is a philosophical argument for not expecting totally deterministic
psychological laws: if one admits that a totally deterministic law can be
corroborated when observing psychological phenomena in the M(X)×M(Y )
language, one accepts that there is no need for free will in some specific
conditions (α). In other terms, such psychological phenomena obey what
Searle (1983) calls physical causality as opposed to intentional causality. The
case of partial determinacy leaves room for free will as a defining feature of
psychological systems, however they can be described.
Suppose a psychological law has been discovered, such that β is a sub-
set of several values. Such law acknowledges the irreducible uncertainty of
(human) behavior but bounds it within the fixed limits of β given α. Hence,
such scientific knowledge implies that punctual prediction in M(Y ) is not ex-
pected given the available scientific knowledge. If applied psychologists are to
be serving the social demand by proposing better expectations, they cannot
argue that their better expectations are valid when applied to single cases.
In the domain of psychological assessment, we contend that the P1-paradigm
allows researchers interested in satisfying the social demand through psycho-
logical measurements (or index-numerology according to Johnson, 1943) to
establish that quantitative psychological attributes can be measured because
measurement is possible without deterministic laws–even without partially
deterministic laws (for a more detailed discussion, see Vautier et al., 2012).
As argued by Atlan (1986), the domination of the natural sciences rests on
their technical efficiency. The technical efficiency in the social sciences relates
to decision making under uncertainty. It can be expected that a psychological
science programmed to demonstrate partial determinism of (human) behavior
should provoke fierce resistance in the community of social scientists who
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justify its efforts with respect to social utility. But social utility should not be
a sine qua non for advancing psychological research. If the scientific endeavor
depends to an excessive extent on the social utility of its applications, it
seems that the scientific endeavor has to be of the (neo-)Galtonian sort. We
advocate room for disinterested research (see Michell, 1997), which entails
a publishing space for P2-researchers. We would enjoy being able to claim
that psychological laws of form (1), or equivalently, relations with graphs
of form (17), have been discovered since the historical beginnings of the
scientific endeavor in psychology, and that such claims can be qualified for
their intrinsic scientific interest. Currently, to deserve publication, research
articles have to be (i) socially interesting or (ii) motivated by rationales
formulated in a non-descriptive but substantive language to be perceived
as theoretically relevant. Taking into account the epistemological limits of
these practices, this seems counter effective. To discover psychological laws
(i.e., descriptive statements that are true for any individual person in given
conditions) we need to be able to develop a nomothetic research programme,
and, for this, public knowledge of the existence of these ideas is of paramount
importance.
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